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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF LEROY
CHAPl\lAN, PETITION FOR A
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
\

- vs.-

!

Case
No. 8147

~IARCEI~L

GRAH.A_M, Warden,
State Prison,
Defendant and Appellant.

Brief of

App~llant

STATEMENT OF

FA_crrs

LeRoy Chapman 'vas received at the Utah State
Prison on August 23rd, 1950, (R. 56) under sentence
and commitment for a term of not less than one nor
more than twenty years for the crime of burglary in
the second degree. (R. 55) At the time of his incarceration and for years prior thereto, 1943-1945 (R. 19),
Chapman had suffered from a residual poliomyelitis of
the right arm and hand; he was unable to flex the wrist
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and oppose the thumb. (Ex. 2) On July 14th, 1952,
Chapman was granted a parole from the prison, one
of the reasons for parole being his desire to have an
operation on the disabled hand and arm. (R. 17) Chapman was permitted to leave the State of Utah for thiH
specific purpose. (R. 27) In January of 1953, he entered
the Mayo Clinic at Rochester, Minnesota, where he
underwent surgery for this condition on February 13th
following. (R. 27) Approximately ten or eleven days
thereafter, he was permitted to leave the clinic (R. 28),
being required to return daily (R. 35) during a satisfactory convalescence until the cast was changed on
February 28th, 1953. (Ex. 2) That cast was to remain
on the hand and arm for approximately three months
and thereafter further surgery was to be performed.
(Ex. 2) However, before that time arrived, Chapman's
parole was revoked and he was, on April 24th, 1953,
returned to the Utah State Prison. (R. 56) Chapman
was charged with having violated his parole in three
particulars: (1) In having associated with one Max
.Jones, a former fellow inmate of the Utah State Prison;
(R. 34) (2) in having committed a misdemeanor, slugging telephones, for which he served a. thirty-five days'
sentence; (R. 35) and (3) for having in his possession
certain tools alleged to be burglar tools. (R. 36) Chapman admitted violations one and two but denied that
the circular saw 'vith carborundum blades was a burglar
tool such as may be used for breaking into safes, and
also denied other tools found in his possession were
burglar tools.
2
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Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed to
secure Chapman's release in order that he be afforded
further surgical ministration. It was alleged that cruel
and inhuman punishment "ras being inflicted upon the
petitioner in violation of Amendment VIII of the Constitution of the United States of America, and Article I,
Section 9, of the Constitution of the State of Utah; that,
the petitioner was treated \vith unnecessary rigor in
violation of the law, in that (a) he was taken into custody and forcibly removed from the care of his surgeon;
(b) that he was refused and restrained from receiving
medical attention; (c) that he was completely deprived
of competent medical care while incarcerated in the Utah
State Prison; (d) that the respondent, Warden Marcell
Graham, the Board of Pardons and the Board of Corrections at all times refused to permit him to consult \vith
or be placed under the care of any competent surgeon.
On January 4th, 1954, the District Court of the
Third Judicial District, State of Utah, the Honorable
Joseph G. Jeppson, Judge, found:
THE COURT: In this matter the Court finds
a very novel situation in that the Warden claims
that his hands are tied and he cannot give the
medical treatment as required, and the state contends that for that reason the action against the
Warden-! suppose by inference from you argument-might not be proper, and it might be
proper to bring the action against the Board of
Corrections.
The Court is of the opinion that the action
against the Warden is proper, even though he
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may not be able, 'vithout the consent of the Board
of Corrections, to give the treatment necessary.
If the defendant is deprived of his rights, the
Warden certainly has him in custody, and the
actions for his dealings would properly he
brought against the Warden, even though the
Warden has no personal ill will, or even though
he does not have the ability to grant the defendant his rights.
The Court finds in this case that during the
period since the petitioner was sentenced, that
he has acquired a need for medical care, and the
evidence is uncontroverted and clear that there
is need for medical treatment, or he will suffer
a loss in the use of his arm and hand.
The Court is of the opinion that a continued
incarceration must be accompanied by a reasonable medical treatment, and that in this case, the
petitioner is deprived of that treatment; that
being deprived of it is a violation of his right;
that it constitutes cruel and inhuman treatment
and is illegal and unconstitutional.
The Court further finds from the evidence
that it constitutes a punishment on the part of
the State for the violation of his parole by denying him medical treatment in view of the fact
that the need arose during the period of his
parole.
The Court finds that it is improper. The Writ
of Habeas Corpus is granted, and it is ordered
that the petitioner be released and discharged
forth,vith. (R. 76, 77)
rrhereafter, on the 29th day of January, 1954, the
court entered its formal Findings of Fact, Conclusions
4
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of La\Y and Order. (R. 81, 82) The Attorney General
for and on behalf of the respondent and of the State of
Utah takes this appeal.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS WAS A PROPER
REMEDY FOR REVIEW OF PETITIONER'S COMPLAINTS ABOUT INCIDENTS OF PRISON MANAGEl\,fENT SINCE COURTS HAVE NO FUNCTION
TO SUPERINTEND THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS IN THE STATE PENITENTIARY.
POINT II
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF REASONABLE MEDICAL TREATMENT IN VIOLATION OF
HIS CONSTITUTIONAL.RIGHTS.
POINT III
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FINDING THAT
PETITIONER WAS SUBJECTED TO CRUEL AND
INHUMAN TREATMENT, AND, THAT THE ALLEGED REFUSAL OF MEDICAL ATTENTION
WAS AN ADDITIONAL PUNISHMENT FOR PETITIONER'S HAVING VIOLATED HIS PAROLE.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS WAS A PROPER
REMEDY FOR REVIEW OF PETITIONER'S COM5
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PLAINTS ABOUT INCIDENTS OF PRISON MANAGEMENT SINCE COURTS HAVE NO FUNCTION
TO SUPERINTEND THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS IN THE STATE PENITENTIARY.
The Board of Pardons and the Board of Corrections
were created by, and look for their authority to, the
Constitution of the State of Utah.
Section 12 of Article VII, Constitution of Utah,
created the Board of Pardons and declared that, ''until
otherwise provided by law" the Governor, Justices of
the Supreme Court and the Attorney General should
have the right to commute punishments and grant pardons. Section 13 of Article VII, Constitution of Utah
established, ''until otherwise provided by law,'' the
Board of Prison Commissioners. The Governor, Secretary of State and Attorney General were named to
constitute this board and were charged with supervision
of all matters in connection with the State Prison. By
legislative enactment, the present Board of Pardons has
succeeded the constitutionally established board, Sec.
77-62-2, U.C.A. 1953; and, the present Board of Corrections has succeeded the constitutionally established
Board of Prison Commissioners, Sec. 64-9-2, U.C.A.
1953. These boards have now the constitutional powers
and duties of their ·predecessors.
Title 64, Chapter 9,
of this State pertaining
ance and regulation of
powers of the Board of

U.C.A. 1953, declares the law
to the establishment, maintenthe Utah State Prison. The
Corrections and of the Board
6
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of Pardons are therein enumerated and defined, Sec.
64-9-2, U.C.A. 1953. The Legislature enacted these la,vs
to direct those charged with constitutional duty for the
operation of the Prison and the management thereof.
Our Legislature has at no time conferred upon the
courts of this State any responsibility for the operation
of the prison and, in the absence of a constitutional
amendment, could not, by so doing, deprive either the
Board of Corrections or the Board of Pardons of their
authority in that respect. We find no Utah decision
wherein it has been held that the writ of habeas corpus
may be availed of to secure the release of a prisoner
on the ground that confinement in the State Prison was
impairing his health. Our court has held:
In habeas corpus proceedings, nothing is inquired into except the legality of the restraint.
Jones v. Moore, 61 Utah 383, 213 P. 191, 193.

If the issue here is a matter of first impression in this
jurisdiction, such is not the case elsewhere and the
question has been no stranger in other courts and has
often been adjudicated. The Criminal Court of Appeals
of Oklahoma said:
Without stating our conclusions upon the
question of fact as to the actual physical condition
of the petitioner, we deem it only necessary to
state that in a habeas corpus proceeding, where
no question is raised as to the validity of a judgment upon which a commitment is based, but the
only question involved is one of fact as to the
health of the accused, that such question involves
a matter of clemency to be addressed to the

7
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Governor. Since the petitioner may again seek
clemency at the hands of the Governor, it is not
proper that we express an opinion as to this
man's physical condition, as such question is a
question for the sole determination of the chief
executive in whom the power to extend clemenry
is vested. * * *
·
* * * Art. 6, Sec. 10, Oklahoma Constitution,
Okl. St. Ann. Const., provides: ''The Governor
shall have the power to grant, after conviction,
rep~ieves, commutations, paroles, and pardons
for all offenses, except cases of impeachment,
upon such conditions and with such restrictions
and limitations as he may deem proper, subject
to such regulations as may be prescribed by
law. * * *"

We have held in Ex Parte Ridley, 3 Okla., Cr.
350, 106 P. 549, 26 L.R.A., N .S., 110, in one of
the early opinions of this court by Judge Doyle,
that under this constitutional provision, the Governor has exclusive power to parole a convict,
with such restrictions and limitations as he may
deem proper; and any law which restricted this
·power would be unconstitutional and void. This
case further held that under our Constitution, it
is the duty and prerogative of the legislative department to define crime and fix the maximum
and minimum penalty, and to fix by law the kind
and manner of punishment, and provide such
disciplinary regulation for prisoners, not in conflict with the fundamental law, as the legislature
deems best. It is the duty of the judiciary department to try offenders against those laws, and
upon conviction to sentence them under the statute. That after a conviction has become final,
it is not within the functions of the courts or legislature to interfere with the pardoning power of
the chief executive.

8
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Coburn v. Schroeder, (1941), 112 P. 2d 191.
It was held in Plalek v. Aderhold,. Warden, C.C.A. 5th
Circuit, 73 F. 2d 173, that:

* * * the court has no power to interfere with the
conduct of the prison or its discipline, but only
on habeas corpus to deliver from the prison those
who are illegally detained there. * * *
The holding in Platek v. Aderhold, supra, was followed
and affirmed in Sarshik v. Sanford, 142 F. 2d 676. In
California, where the petitioner alleged ill health, the
court held that the questions raised were medical, sci entific and administrative rather than judicial. The petition for the writ of habeas corpus was denied, Kauble v.
Haynes, (1946), 64 Fed. Supp. 153. In Edmondson v.
Warden, (1949), 69 A. 2d 919, the court held that habeas
corpus was not a remedy for review of complaints about
incidents of prison management and that the Board of
Corrections there had full power and control over the
House of Corrections. The United States District Court
for West Virginia in the case of Un.ited States ex rel
Bowe, et al. v. Skeen, (1952), 107 Fed. Supp. 879, said:

* * * The petition should be dismissed * * * the
'vrit of habeas corpus cannot be used to correct
alleged mistreatment by prison authorities of
prisoners subject to valid judgment and commitment. * * *
We contend, for this Point I, that it must be presumed that the Board of Corrections is properly exercising its authority in the operation of the prison and
that the judiciary of this State should be hesitant to
9
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substitute their judgment for that of the Board where
the result becomes an infringement upon the executive
branch of government. There is a remedy in the courts
which may be availed of to control and restrain government agencies when such restraint or control is necessary or desirable; we do not think that remedy, in such
as the instant case, to be the writ of habeas corpus.
POINT II
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF REASONABLE MEDICAL TREATMENT IN VIOLATION OF
HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
The evidence does not sustain the finding of the
court below.
Norman L. Beck, M.D., orthopedic surgeon, and a
witness for petitioner testified that he first saw the
petl.tioner on June 3, 1953, (R. 12), in fact, the petitioner
had been examined by Dr. Beck in March of 1952. (R.
13, 22) Subsequent to June 3, 1953, the petitioner was
attended by Dr. Beck on June 24th, ~July 6th and September 21st, 1953. (R. 15) The doctor recommended
further surgery on petitioner's hand ''without too great
delay'' ; ( R. 18) he had made his report to the Board
of Corrections. (R. 19) The Board of Corrections had
been informed by this witness in June of 1953 that a
delay in the performance of surgery of six or eight
months would not be too long, (R. 20) and the doctor
could not answer yes or no at the hearing as to what
10
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the exact time would be that would constitute too great
a delay. (R. 20) X-rays taken on July 6th, 1953, showed
that the bone in petitioner's hand was completely fused
and that under such circumstances, there should be no
discomfort. (R. 23) The doctor concluded by testifying
that he was willing to perform the necessary surgery
with petitioner's consent and cooperation and that it
would not be necessary that the petitioner be released
from th~ penitentiary during convalescence therefrom.
(R. 24, 25)
LeRoy Chapman, the petitioner, on his own behalf
testified that his requests for medical attention subsequent to his return to the prison had been constantly
denied, (R. 31) but, he then said that he was told to
abide by the decision of the prison physician and he
was "constantly referred to Dr. Jones." (R. 31) The
petitioner admitted of his appointments with Dr. Beck
(R. 31) and admitted further that it was not his intention nor desire to have the necessary surgery performed
in Utah, (R. 32) also that he had never consented to
have the surgery performed in Utah. (R. 37)

J. 0. Jones, M.D., prison physician, testified that
he attended the petitioner at the prison dispensary on
several occasions and that he did not think that at any
time the need for surgery in this case had been imperative. (R. 42) The doctor testified that he gave his permission for the petitioner to consult Dr. Beck. (R. 47)
Andrew Unamuno, medical officer at the Utah State
Prison, testified that to his knowledge the petitioner had
11
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never been refused attention at the infirmary; (R. 48)
that he received what treatment he requested. (R. 52)
Marcell Graham, warden, testified that he had never
interferred with the petitioner's receiving medical attention; (R. 58, 61) that the petitioner had refused to have
the surgery performed by Dr. Beck; (R. 59) that the
Board of Corrections would permit petitioner the operation if he, the petitioner, would pay for it. (R. 66, 71)
Warden Graham had interceded on petitioner's behalf
before the Board of Pardons and the Board of Corrections. (R. 74)
For Point II we contend that the petitioner was not
denied reasonable medical attention and further that the
State of Utah was under no obligation to provide the
petitioner with the facilities of the Mayo Clinic at Rochester, Minnesota; nor, for that matter, to expend state
funds for an operation locally, under the circumstances
in this case, even had petitioner consented thereto. We
cannot subscribe to any such proposition that an offer
of payment for the operation by some third person
should or could be a reason for, a consideration for, or
an excuse for, the granting of the writ of habeas corpus.
POINT III
THE COURT BELOvV ERRED IN FINDING THAT
PETITIONER WAS SUBJECTED TO CRUEL AND
INHUMAN TREA.TMENT, AND, THAT THE ALLEGED REFUSAL OF MEDICAL ATTENTION
WAS AN ADDITIONAL PUNISHMENT FOR PETl
TIONER'S HAVING VIOLATED HIS PAROLE.

12
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Amendment VIII of the Constitution of the United
States declares:
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.
Article I, Section 9, of the Constitution of the State
of Utah reads :
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive
fines shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and
unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with
unnecessary rigor.
The petitioner complains that he was subjected to
cruel and inhuman punishment and treated with unnecessary rigor. (R. 1) The court found that being deprived
of reasonable medical treatment constituted cruel and
inhuman treatment and treatment 'vith unnecessary
rigor. (R. 82)
It has been held that the term "cruel and unusual
punishment'' applies to something inhuman and barbarous, torture and the like. In Re Ward, 295 Mich. 742,
746, 295 N.W. 483. People v. Sarnoff, 302 Mich. 266, 4
N.W. 2d 544. In the case of Smith v. Command, (Mich.)
204 N.W. 140, 40 A.L.R. 525, 527, Weist, J., dissenting,
had this to say:
In examining the subject of cruel and unusual
punishments, I have been surprised at the dearth
of adjudications. This fact, however, speaks well
for American legislation. It must be assumed
13
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that the framers of the Bill of Rights had knowledge of former cruel and unusual punishments,
whether adjudged under some law or imposed by
despotic and arbitrary power. They knew of
quartering, of slitting the nose and cropping the
ears, of nailing the tongue to a post, of crucifixion,
of flogging at the cart's tail, of disemboweling,
cutting off hands, .and of branding, of castration,
of burning, of peine forte et dure, of the rack and
thumbscrews, etc., and they emphatically said,
''Never again.''
Examples of cruel and unusual punishments were referred to in the case of Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130,
135 as:
* * * Where the prisoner was drawn or dragged
to the place of execution, in treason; or where
he was emboweled alive, beheaded, and quartered,
in high treason. * * =K, public dissection in murder,
and burning alive in treason committed by a
female. * * *

Mr. Justice McKenna discusses the subject at length
in Weems v. U. 8., 217 U.S. 349, 368 et seq., and gives
a.n interesting historical dissertation thereon.
In searching the case law for a determination of
what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment we have
found numerous decisions. It becomes apparent upon
reading these cases that there is no hard and fast definitive rule and that the circumstances of each individual
case must determine whether punishment is cruel or
unusual within the meaning of the constitutional provi-

14
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s1ons. (*Without comment thereon we cite in a footnote
some of the decisions we feel to be pertinent to the case
at bar.) The extreme cruel and unusual punishments to
\Vhich we have hereinabove referred to are, we appreciate, archaic and such punishments \Vere resorted to
when the fundamental idea back of the criminal law was
one of vengeance. The old l\tlosaic doctrine of ''an eye
for an eye and a tooth for a tooth'' no longer prevails
and such cases read, to us of the present generation, like
scenes from the Inferno of Dante. However, though it
be admitted that all punishments are in some sense cruel,
since punishment imports pain or suffering, the Constitution does not mean that crime for this reason is
to go unpunished.
It has been held that punishment will not be declared excessive because confinement might undermine
the health of an accused, State v. Van Klaveren, (Iowa
1929), 226 N.W. 81, wherein that court said:

* * * the only thing properly coming before us
for our consideration is the punishment which
"\Vas inflicted by the court, which the defendant
alleges is excessive. The motion of the defendant
is supported by the affidavits of himself and wife
and a physician. Their affidavits are to the effect
that the defendant is not in the prime of health
and that a long period of confinement in the
county jail might undermine his health and lead
*U. S. v. Ragen, 54 Fed. Supp. 973; In Re Pinaire, 46 Fed. Supp.
113; In Re Calhoun, 94 N.E. 2d 388; Delnegro v. State, 81 A. 2d
241; Geurin v. City of Little Rock, 155 S.W. 2d 719; Harp.er v.
Wall, 85 Fed. Supp. 783; Ex Parte Pickens, 101 Fed. Supp. 285;
Siegel, et al., v. Ragen, et al., 88 Fed. Supp. 996.

15
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to serious consequences. It is sufficient to say
that a period of confinement by way of imprisonment might weaken the condition of a healthy
man, and that many men now in good health will
pass into eternity before the expiration of the
period of imprisonment given to the defendant,
but that is not sufficient reason why the guilty
should not be punished. * * *
To the _record in the case at bar: The petitioner,
Chapman, 'vas being restrained of his liberty by the
defendant at the Utah State Prison under a lawful commitment and order of the District Court of the Second
Judicial District of the State of Utah. He had been
paroled from that institution on July 14th, 1952, upon
his application therefor so that he might obtain surgical
care for his disabled arm and hand. (R. 26) In January
of 1953, petitioner entered Mayo Clinic at Rochester,
Minnesota, for that purpose; (R. 27) whereat he was
receiving the finest attention he had ever had. (R. 35)
However, he was unable to avoid the toils of the law,
( R. 35, 36) or to live up to the terms of his parole. (R.
34, 35, 36) Consequently, he found himself, on April
24th, 1953, back in prison and the second phase of his
surgical need not yet accomplished. The refusal of the
Board of Pardons to again parole petitioner or to have
the second opera.tion performed at the Mayo Clinic in
Rochester, Minnesota, at state expense is the cruel a;nd
unusual punishment and treatrnent with u,nnecessary
rigor of which petitioner complains. There is nothing
in the record to indicate that petitioner received treatment while incarcerated in the Utah State Penitentiary
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different than that afforded any other inmate of the
prison. There is nothing in the record which indicates
that petitioner suffered physical discomfort, to the contrary, his witness, Doctor N. R. Beck, testified to the
effect that 'vhere the fusion of the bone was complete,
there should be no discomfort. (R. 23) The petitioner
was not assigned work at the prison which was not
within his physical capabilities. (R. 42) He was never
refused attention at the prison infirmary. (R. 48) The
warden had never interfered with the petitioner receiving medical attention. (R. 58, 61, 62) The petitioner
refused to have the operation performed in Utah, (R.
32, 37, 59) although Dr. N. R. Beck of this city was
qualified (Ex. 2) and willing to proceed. (R. 24) If
petitioner \vould have consented to having the surgery
performed here, the matter could then have been presented to the Board of Corrections for their determination. (R. 74)
For this Point III, we hold that the record does not
sustain a finding that petitioner was subjected to cruel
and inhuman (unusual) treatment and treatment with
unnecessary rigor. On the contrary, the reeord shows
conclusively that petitioner was afforded every consideration by the penal authorities, all of them. There is
no evidence of abuse or mistreatment. There is evidence
of compassion (his parole), of consideration (work assignments), of care (medical attention), and of solicitude (the warden's efforts on his behalf \vith both the
authorities and with petitioner's family). Society has
n-ot neglected its obligation to the petitioner; but society
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has been imposed upon, and taken advantage of, through
his release.
CONCLUSION
Courts should, of course, exercise their power to
prevent any inhuman or cruel treatment, when properly
called upon so to do, of those unfortunate enough to be
confined in jails. But the courts should not hamper
officials charged with the duty of maintaining prisons
and having custody of those convicted of crimes by
interfering with the regulation or management thereof
in the absence of unreasonable or capricious conduct or
the neglect of duty. We are unaware of any legitimate
complaint heretofore directed to the management of
Utah's modern and excellent State Prison.
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order of the lower court should be set aside and held
for naught; and, the cause should be remanded with
directions to the court below to return the petitioner
to the custody of the warden.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER
Attorney General
WALTER L. BUDGE
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellant
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